RHETORIC ANDTHE REALITY IN AIR WAREFARE
Posted: Sat Jul 28, 2012 10:48 am
RHETORIC ANDTHE REALITY IN AIR WAREFARE
By Tami Davis Biddle
Following on from the “Fire and the Fury” by Randell Hansen I took on the challenge of reading another book from America, I was glad I did. The book explains in some detail the evolution of both the British and American ideas of Strategic bombing from the Great War to May 1945.
This really is a great read for anyone interested in the development of Bomber Command and the US 8th Air force in Europe. Unlike Hansen’s book this graphically illustrates and candidly records the limitations of American “precision” daylight bombing and Bomber Commands area bombing campaign; however it also demonstrates the effects of the Bomber Offensives and its major contribution to the defeat of Germany. The author obviously researched the subject in some detail and cannot be accused of pulling her punches, on the subject of American “precision” attacks in the autumn early winter of 1944 and attacking cloud covered targets Biddle writes:
“ A post war American “Precision” Survey which covered the effects of 57 American “Precision” strikes on three separate synthetic oil plants revelled that only 2.2 per cent of the bombs dropped hit “damageable” buildings and equipment, no less than 87.1 per cent were spread over the surrounding country side – outside the perimeters of the plants”.
The book is equally critical of Bomber Command however not in the usual way; Biddle tends to concentrate her criticisms more towards the commanders than the command. Without going into the usual rhetoric of mass bombing of innocent civilian, Biddle concentrates on the development and struggles between the Commands hierarchy and how this had an effect of the commands at times chaotic and rather scatter-gun approach to attacking targets from June 1944 onwards. Did Harris adhere to the directives issued to him by the CAS and how did his reluctance to fully endorse these directives effect Bomber Command. ?
A book more for those interested in policies and strategies.
Smudger
By Tami Davis Biddle
Following on from the “Fire and the Fury” by Randell Hansen I took on the challenge of reading another book from America, I was glad I did. The book explains in some detail the evolution of both the British and American ideas of Strategic bombing from the Great War to May 1945.
This really is a great read for anyone interested in the development of Bomber Command and the US 8th Air force in Europe. Unlike Hansen’s book this graphically illustrates and candidly records the limitations of American “precision” daylight bombing and Bomber Commands area bombing campaign; however it also demonstrates the effects of the Bomber Offensives and its major contribution to the defeat of Germany. The author obviously researched the subject in some detail and cannot be accused of pulling her punches, on the subject of American “precision” attacks in the autumn early winter of 1944 and attacking cloud covered targets Biddle writes:
“ A post war American “Precision” Survey which covered the effects of 57 American “Precision” strikes on three separate synthetic oil plants revelled that only 2.2 per cent of the bombs dropped hit “damageable” buildings and equipment, no less than 87.1 per cent were spread over the surrounding country side – outside the perimeters of the plants”.
The book is equally critical of Bomber Command however not in the usual way; Biddle tends to concentrate her criticisms more towards the commanders than the command. Without going into the usual rhetoric of mass bombing of innocent civilian, Biddle concentrates on the development and struggles between the Commands hierarchy and how this had an effect of the commands at times chaotic and rather scatter-gun approach to attacking targets from June 1944 onwards. Did Harris adhere to the directives issued to him by the CAS and how did his reluctance to fully endorse these directives effect Bomber Command. ?
A book more for those interested in policies and strategies.
Smudger